From 1233d81523e40bec36476573ac2b4dcbcd82dc85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kristen Newbury <knewbury01@github.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 14:11:17 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Improve
 actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutX queries

---
 actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml  |  4 ++--
 .../src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql | 17 +++++++++++------
 .../CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md        |  3 ++-
 .../CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql        |  2 +-
 .../Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md   |  3 ++-
 .../Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql   |  2 +-
 .../Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md |  3 ++-
 ...026-04-15-untrusted-checkout-improvements.md |  6 ++++++
 8 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 actions/ql/src/change-notes/2026-04-15-untrusted-checkout-improvements.md

diff --git a/actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml b/actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml
index 3c1aec70a240..d15b8d7a6a5f 100644
--- a/actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml
+++ b/actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extensions:
       - ["(source|sh|bash|zsh|fish)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\b", 2]
       - ["(node)\\s+([^\\s]+)(\\.js|\\.ts)\\b", 2]
       - ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.py\\b", 2]
+      - ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+([\\-m]+)\\s+(\\w+)\\b", 2] # eg: pythonX -m anything(dir or file)
       - ["(ruby)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.rb\\b", 2]
-      - ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.go\\b", 3]
+      - ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)\\s+([^\\s]+)", 3]
       - ["(dotnet)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.csproj\\b", 2]
-
diff --git a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql
index 8bc3fe8f51ad..22ab430105a3 100644
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * @name Code injection
  * @description Interpreting unsanitized user input as code allows a malicious user to perform arbitrary
  *              code execution.
- * @kind path-problem
+ * @ kind path-problem
  * @problem.severity warning
  * @security-severity 5.0
  * @precision medium
@@ -18,8 +18,13 @@ import actions
 import codeql.actions.security.CodeInjectionQuery
 import CodeInjectionFlow::PathGraph
 
-from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink
-where mediumSeverityCodeInjection(source, sink)
-select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
-  "Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user.", sink,
-  sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getRawExpression()
+// from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink
+// where mediumSeverityCodeInjection(source, sink)
+// select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
+//   "Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user.", sink,
+//   sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getRawExpression()
+from string test
+where
+  test.regexpMatch("(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.py\\b") and
+  test = "python -m dir" //go run main/main.go //go run .
+select test
diff --git a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md
index 6060354b134a..246e302e85b8 100644
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ## Overview
 
-GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
+GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A dangerous misuse of event triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted input from the PR may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed in a privileged job. Untrusted code may get executed due to a modified build script, workflow injection, or registry hijacking. **Carefully review** whether least privileges is used and whether input is taken from untrusted sources.
 
 ## Recommendation
 
@@ -133,3 +133,4 @@ jobs:
 ## References
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
+- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql
index ad79a1ce776f..8e8882f9cf5f 100644
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql
@@ -51,5 +51,5 @@ where
   event.getName() = checkoutTriggers() and
   not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(checkout, event, "untrusted-checkout")) and
   not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(poisonable, event, "untrusted-checkout"))
-select poisonable, checkout, poisonable,
+select checkout, checkout, poisonable,
   "Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@)", event, event.getName()
diff --git a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md
index 6060354b134a..f412421b7f1d 100644
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ## Overview
 
-GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
+GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A dangerous misuse of event triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted input from the PR may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed in a privileged job. Untrusted code may get executed due to a modified build script, workflow injection, or registry hijacking. **Carefully review** whether least privileges is used and whether input is taken from untrusted sources.
 
 ## Recommendation
 
@@ -133,3 +133,4 @@ jobs:
 ## References
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
+- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/). 
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql
index 98b9aee33f77..5c2d4b3d56c8 100644
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * @name Checkout of untrusted code in trusted context
+ * @name Checkout of untrusted code in privileged context without privileged context use
  * @description Privileged workflows have read/write access to the base repository and access to secrets.
  *              By explicitly checking out and running the build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment
  *              that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.
diff --git a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md
index 6060354b134a..246e302e85b8 100644
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ## Overview
 
-GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
+GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A dangerous misuse of event triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted input from the PR may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed in a privileged job. Untrusted code may get executed due to a modified build script, workflow injection, or registry hijacking. **Carefully review** whether least privileges is used and whether input is taken from untrusted sources.
 
 ## Recommendation
 
@@ -133,3 +133,4 @@ jobs:
 ## References
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
+- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/actions/ql/src/change-notes/2026-04-15-untrusted-checkout-improvements.md b/actions/ql/src/change-notes/2026-04-15-untrusted-checkout-improvements.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ef16e84e2c21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/actions/ql/src/change-notes/2026-04-15-untrusted-checkout-improvements.md
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+---
+category: majorAnalysis
+---
+* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur. Additionally alter 2 patterns in the detection such that now extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. This may lead to more results being detected by all 3 queries.
+* Adjusted `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical` to align more with other untrusted resource queries, where the alert location is the location where the artifact is obtained from (the checkout point). This aligns with the other 2 related queries. This will cause the same alerts to re-open for closed alerts of this query.
+* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context. This will cause the same alerts to re-open for closed alerts of this query.
\ No newline at end of file

From a342efca0e6e04889b87be3925db7b13d00e3a9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kristen Newbury <knewbury01@github.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 16:12:52 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 2/6] Revert accidental change

---
 .../src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql | 17 ++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql
index 22ab430105a3..8bc3fe8f51ad 100644
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * @name Code injection
  * @description Interpreting unsanitized user input as code allows a malicious user to perform arbitrary
  *              code execution.
- * @ kind path-problem
+ * @kind path-problem
  * @problem.severity warning
  * @security-severity 5.0
  * @precision medium
@@ -18,13 +18,8 @@ import actions
 import codeql.actions.security.CodeInjectionQuery
 import CodeInjectionFlow::PathGraph
 
-// from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink
-// where mediumSeverityCodeInjection(source, sink)
-// select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
-//   "Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user.", sink,
-//   sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getRawExpression()
-from string test
-where
-  test.regexpMatch("(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.py\\b") and
-  test = "python -m dir" //go run main/main.go //go run .
-select test
+from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink
+where mediumSeverityCodeInjection(source, sink)
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
+  "Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user.", sink,
+  sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getRawExpression()

From c9e5dbda782fea39790bd736bebaa8a15d59226d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kristen Newbury <knewbury01@github.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 16:26:38 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] Update actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml

Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
---
 actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml b/actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml
index d15b8d7a6a5f..cf7f71dccc94 100644
--- a/actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml
+++ b/actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml
@@ -72,5 +72,5 @@ extensions:
       - ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.py\\b", 2]
       - ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+([\\-m]+)\\s+(\\w+)\\b", 2] # eg: pythonX -m anything(dir or file)
       - ["(ruby)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.rb\\b", 2]
-      - ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)\\s+([^\\s]+)", 3]
+      - ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)(?:\\s+-[^\\s]+)*\\s+([^\\s]+)", 3]
       - ["(dotnet)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.csproj\\b", 2]

From 589e1e5c197483f4ff8d31d70c12dda8a016c2d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kristen Newbury <knewbury01@github.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 16:27:06 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] Update actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml

Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
---
 actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml b/actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml
index cf7f71dccc94..17b1408fa7c3 100644
--- a/actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml
+++ b/actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extensions:
       - ["(source|sh|bash|zsh|fish)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\b", 2]
       - ["(node)\\s+([^\\s]+)(\\.js|\\.ts)\\b", 2]
       - ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.py\\b", 2]
-      - ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+([\\-m]+)\\s+(\\w+)\\b", 2] # eg: pythonX -m anything(dir or file)
+      - ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+-m\\s+([A-Za-z_][\\w\\.]*)\\b", 2] # eg: pythonX -m anything(dir or file)
       - ["(ruby)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.rb\\b", 2]
       - ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)(?:\\s+-[^\\s]+)*\\s+([^\\s]+)", 3]
       - ["(dotnet)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.csproj\\b", 2]

From ed4e2bc5b93ae618ec07dff2c4ba0aa5f853555d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kristen Newbury <knewbury01@github.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 16:29:57 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 5/6] Improve formatting helpfiles

---
 actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md | 2 +-
 actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md     | 2 +-
 actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md   | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md
index 246e302e85b8..a4fceb1f8da3 100644
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md
@@ -133,4 +133,4 @@ jobs:
 ## References
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
-- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).
\ No newline at end of file
+- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).
diff --git a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md
index f412421b7f1d..a4fceb1f8da3 100644
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md
@@ -133,4 +133,4 @@ jobs:
 ## References
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
-- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/). 
\ No newline at end of file
+- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).
diff --git a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md
index 246e302e85b8..a4fceb1f8da3 100644
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md
@@ -133,4 +133,4 @@ jobs:
 ## References
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
-- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).
\ No newline at end of file
+- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

From 81532c7ce672ecaa27077049278c8d9b82529bed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kristen Newbury <knewbury01@github.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2026 11:37:03 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 6/6] Fix outstanding expected file

---
 .../UntrustedCheckoutCritical.expected        | 78 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)

diff --git a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.expected b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.expected
index 39e54b2bbaed..e7c208d1bdbe 100644
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.expected
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.expected
@@ -334,42 +334,42 @@ edges
 | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_3.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_3.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step |
 #select
-| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/reusable_caller1.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/reusable_caller3.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test10.yml:8:3:8:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test11.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test17.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test26.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test29.yml:1:5:1:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/reusable_caller1.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/reusable_caller3.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test10.yml:8:3:8:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test11.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test17.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test26.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test29.yml:1:5:1:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |